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JURISDICTION
The order that is the subject of this appeal is a
final order and judgment of the Third Judicial District Court of
Salt Lake County.

Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 42 the Utah

Supreme Court transferred this appeal to the Court of Appeals
for disposition.

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of

this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court err in granting Dayna' s

motion for a "directed verdict" at the conclusion of Searles's
case?
Because this case was tried to the bench and not to a
jury, Dayna' s motion is more properly identified as a motion for
involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b), Utah R. Civ. P.

When a

trial court has granted involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b)
made findings and entered judgment thereon, it is the appellate
court' s duty to review the evidence in the light most favorable
to the findings.

Lawrence v. Bamberger Railroad Co. , 3 Utah 2d

247, 282 P. 2d 335 (1955); Child v. Havward. 16 Utah 2d 351, 400
P. 2d 758 (1965); Petty v. Gindv Mfg. Corn. . 17 Utah 2d 32, 404
P. 2d 30 (1965); Petrie v. General Contracting Co. , 17 Utah 2d
408, 413 P. 2d 600 (1966). The trial court's findings of fact
will be reversed only if clearly erroneous.
are reviewed for correctness.

Conclusions of law

Southern Title Guarantee Co. v.

Bethers, 761 P.2d 951 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

2.

Did the trial court err in denying Searles'

motion to amend the pleadings to allow parol evidence to vary
the terms of Searles' written contract of employment?
A motion to amend the pleadings falls within the sound
discretion of the trial court and is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion.

Kelly v. Utah Power & Light, 746 P. 2d 1189 (Utah

Ct. App. 1987); Westlev v. Farmer' s Insurance Exchange. 663 P. 2d
93 (Utah 1983).
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS
Rule 15(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence.
When issues not raised by the pleading are
tried by express or implied consent of the
parties, they shall be treated in all
respects as if they had been raised in the
pleadings. Such amendments of the pleadings
as may be necessary to cause them to conform
to the evidence and to raise these issues
may be made upon motion of any party at any
time, even after judgment; but failure so to
amend does not affect the result of the
trial of these issues. If evidence is
objected to at the trial on the ground that
it is not within the issues made by the
pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings
to be amended when the presentation of the
merits of the action will be subserved
thereby and the objecting party fails to
satisfy the court that the admission of such
evidence would prejudice him in maintaining
his action or defense upon the merits. The
court shall grant a continuance, if
necessary, to enable the objecting party to
meet such evidence.

-2-

Rule II (] •)

I II .; a il: I ! i :i ] • =M i < ::>:f: C . i i 3 I J :• : i : eduz "«i •

(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof.
• For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or
"to comply with these rules or any order of
court, a defendant may move for dismissal
an action or of any claim against him.
After the plaintiff in an actin tried by * ae
court without a j ury , has completed the
presentation of his evidence the defendant,
without waiving his right to offer evidence
in the event the motion i s not granted, may
move for a dismissal on the ground that upon
the facts and the law the plaintiff has
shown no right to relief. The court as
trier of the facts may then determine them
and render judgment against the plaintiff or
may decline to render any judgment until the
close of all the evidence. If the court
renders judgment on the merits against the
plaintiff, the court shal 1 make findings as
provided in Rule 52(a).
Unless the
subdivision in its order for dismissal
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this
subdivision and any dismissal not provided
for in this rule, other than a dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue
-r for lack of an indispensable party,
..i^ai-^c .o . •-. ^^-inHication upon the me
Rule 52(a)

•:• • ,

k

;

j*vr--

i

.v. a 'rocedure.

(a) Effect
In all actions tried upon the
facts without a jury or with an, advisory
jury, the court shall find the facts
specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment
shall be entered pursuant to Rule 5 8A ; i n
granting or refusing interlocutory
injunctions the court shall similarly set
forth the findings of fact, and conclusions
of law which constitute the grounds of its
action.
Requests for findings are not
necessary for purposes of review.
Find
of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence., shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the
tri al court to judge the credibility of the
-3-

witnesses. The findings of a master, to the
extent that the court adopts them, shall be
considered as the findings of the court. It
will be sufficient if the findings of fact
and conclusions of law are stated orally and
recorded in open court following the close f
the evidence or appear in an opinion or
memorandum of decision filed by the court.
The trial court need not enter findings of
fact and conclusions of law in rulings on
motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b).
The court shall, however, issue a brief
written statement of the ground for its
decision on all motions granted under Rules
12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 5 9 when the
motion is based on more than one ground.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action for breach of a one-year written
employment contract between Plaintiff/Appellant William J.
Searles ("Searles") and Defendant/Appellee Dayna Communications,
Inc. ("Dayna").

Searles was employed as an area director of

sales at Dayna from October 1, 1988 through January 27, 1989
under a written contract that had a one-year term. (R. 3 3 5; Tr.
Ex. P-2, attached hereto as Appendix A)
The contract contains specific termination provisions
including termination "for cause" for Searles' material breach
of his obligations under the contract or for failure of Searles
"to perform the duties assigned to [him] in an acceptable
manner."

(Tr. Ex. P-2)

The contract contains specific

responsibilities of Searles as an area director of sales,
including "[t]o fulfill the Quota requirements established
pursuant to this Agreement."

(Tr. Ex. P-2)
-4-
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Searles filed suit against Dayna alleging two causes
I
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Searles called two witnesses at: tri a 1 , Keith Bradf• :i)i:d
Romne yjr J r. , executive vice p re s i d e nt c • f D a y na,

a nd S e a r 1 e s,

After Searles has presented all evidence ;:-ut: before
rest

*

confw-...
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Tin

in I

explained its findings to the parties (R. 395-9) and entered a
"Statement of Grounds for Directed Verdict, "

(R. 191-3)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

The Trial Court' s Decision to Grant Davna' s Motion for
Involuntary Dismissal Was Not Clearly Erroneous.
A.

Dayna' s Motion for Involuntary Dismissal Was
Inadvertently Mislabeled as a Motion for a
"Directed Verdict."

At the conclusion of Searles' case, Dayna moved for
and was granted a "directed verdict."

Because the case was

tried to the bench and not to a jury, the motion was actually a
motion for involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b).

On appeal,

the motion should be reviewed as a motion for involuntary
dismissal.
B.

Involuntary Dismissal of Searles' Case Was
Appropriate Because Searles Failed to Show any
Right to Relief.

The trial court granted Dayna' s motion because Searles
had failed to establish a prima facie case.

Even if Searles had

presented a prima facie case, the dismissal was appropriate
because Searles failed to carry his burden of persuasion showing
his right to relief.
C.

The Dismissal of Searles' Case Is Well-Supported
by Decisions Under the Parallel Federal Rule.

Decisions under the parallel Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure demonstrate that the dismissal of Searles' case after
his presentation of the evidence was proper.
-6-

II.

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in
Denying Searles' Motion to Amend the Pleadings to
Conform to the Evidence.
?! t: the concJ usi on of h i s i)resentation o f 1:he ovi dence

11 in I. Ije ! i, 11: i •" f o r ma ] ] j i: es t:::i :i:i j hi s c as <i

11 if! d i, ,1 u s in 11 * p e d I <, i \ nif-« i in 1 L h e

pleadings to conform to the evidence,
A.

Searles Failed to Present Anv Admissible Evid ence
that the Written Agreement Was Subject to
Conditions Precedent.

Throughout his presentation of the evidenee,

Sear1es

attempted to introduce parol evidence that would contradict or
vary the expres s terms of his wri 11en agreement wi th Dayna.
After timely objections by Dayna, Searles agreed to offer the
evidence • on ] i
T,

a s foi unci a t: :l on for the ; iri tten aqiveni^nt a m

ar; L:*.

S. , A

ar

' :\e ' .. :r.

\
:

igreement.

o

Thus, no evidence "w as admi tted

le agreement and the denial of the motion

Searles Has Failed to Present Any Evidence That Shows
His Entitlement to Relief.
A

The Law of the Case Doctrine Is Inapplicable in
the Present Case.

Searles has attempted to introduce a transcript of an
oral rulii ng by another judge i n another case as evidence of his
e lit :i t J e int «= iit t: <:::: :i : e J :i e f :i ii !:: h e p r e s e n t • ::::: a s e

Th e t: r a n s c i:i p t h a

no precedential value i n the present case and should be
disregarded for purposes of this appeal.
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ARGUMENT
I.

The Trial Court' s Decision to Grant Davna' s Motion for
Involuntary Dismissal Was Not Clearly Erroneous.
A.

Dayna' s Motion for Involuntary Dismissal Was
Inadvertently Mislabeled as a Motion for
"Directed Verdict. "

At the conclusion of Searles' case, Dayna moved for a
"directed verdict" in its favor.

The court granted the motion,

finding that Searles failed to present a prima facie case.
Because the case was tried to the court and not to a jury, the
motion was more properly a motion for involuntary dismissal
under Rule 41(b).

Although mislabeled by the parties and by the

trial court, the grant of Dayna' s motion was proper and wellsupported.
Inadvertent mislabeling of motions under Rule 41(b)
has been common. l

Parties in non-jury cases have often

mistakenly moved for a directed verdict, or parties in jury

1

Under the parallel Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
provision in federal Rule 41(b) that provided for dismissal for
failure to show a right to relief in a non-jury action was
deleted in 1991 and has been replaced by new Rule 52(c). 5
James W. Moore & Jeremy C. Wicker, Moore' s Federal Practice
11 41. 13 (2d ed. 1992). Federal Rule 52(c) now authorizes entry
of judgment against the defendant as well as the plaintiff, and
earlier than the close of the case of the party against whom
judgment is rendered. A motion to dismiss under Rule 41 on the
ground that a plaintiff s evidence is legally insufficient
should now be treated as a motion for judgment on partial
findings as provided in Rule 52(c). Committee Note of 1991 to
Amended Rule 41(b).
-8-

cases have erroneously sought an involuntary dismissal. L

The

cases have universally held that a mislabeled motion should be
treated as though it had been properly made and judged under the
appropriate standards.

5A James W. Moore & Jeremy C. Wicker,

Moore7 s Federal Practice 1f 50.03[1] (2d ed. 1992).

See, e. a. .

International Union. United Auto. Aerospace & Agricultural
Implement Workers of America. UAW v. Mack Trucks. 917 F. 2d 107
(3d Cir. 1990); Kotzen v. Levine. 678 F. 2d 140 (11th Cir. 1982);
McCorstin v. United States. 621 F. 2d 749 (5th Cir. 1980).
B.

Involuntary Dismissal of Searles' Case Was
Appropriate Because Searles Failed to Show any
Right to Relief.

Rule 41(b) governs involuntary dismissals and in
pertinent part provides as follows:
After the plaintiff in an action tried by
the court without a jury, has completed the
presentation of his evidence the defendant,
without waiving his right to offer evidence
in the event the motion is not granted, may
move for a dismissal on the ground that upon
the facts and the law the plaintiff has
shown no right to relief. The court as
trier of the facts may then determine them
and render judgment against the plaintiff or
may decline to render any judgment until the
close of all the evidence. If the court
renders judgment on the merits against the

2

The Advisory Committee Note to the 1991 amendments to
Rule 50, Fed. R. Civ. P. , indicates that such labeling errors
are "merely formal." Professor Moore anticipates that such
labeling errors will proliferate under the 1991 revisions to the
Rules because of changes in terminology made by the Rules. 5A
James W. Moore & Jeremy C. Wicker, Moore' s Federal Practice
1f 50. 03[1] (2d ed. 1992).
-9-

plaintiff, the court shall make findings as
provided in Rule 52(a).
Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b).
The above-cited rule is substantially identical to
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prior to the
1991 revisions to the Federal Rules.

The Utah Supreme Court has

recognized that Federal interpretations of Federal Rule 41(b)
are applicable to Utah Rule 41(b).

See Wilson v. Lambert, 613

P. 2d 765, 767 n. 2 (Utah 1980); Wineaar v. Slim Olson, Inc. , 122
Utah 487, 252 P. 2d 205, 207 (1953).
The purpose of Rule 41(b) is to permit a defendant to
move for judgment in his favor when the trial court, even before
hearing the defendant' s evidence, determines that the plaintiff
has failed to offer persuasive evidence regarding the necessary
elements of his case.

Feldman v. Pioneer Petroleum, Inc. , 813

F. 2d 296, 299 (10th Cir. ), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 954 (1987).
In the present case, the trial court considered all of the
evidence offered by Searles and concluded that Searles had
failed to prove his case against Dayna.
First, the trial court found no evidence that Dayna
violated any provision of the written contract, reasoning as
follows:
Count 1, the literal contract claim.
There' s been a failure to produce any
evidence that the defendant violated any
terms and conditions of the contract in
terminating the [plaintiff].
[Plaintiff],
according to the evidence, construed in a
-10-

light most favorable for the plaintiff, was
terminated for cause. Cause is defined by
the contract, not by any moral
considerations or anything like that. Cause
in this particular contract is established,
in part, by failure to meet quotas.
The evidence unequivocally indicates
that the [plaintiff] concedes that the
quotas were not met. Therefore, the
contract provision on cause could be
invoked, it was invoked, and the termination
was had, and the termination does not
constitute a violation of the contract.
(R. 396)

Thus, the trial court found no evidence that Dayna's

termination of Searles' employment contract violated any
contract right.
Second, the trial court considered Searles' claim that
Dayna had acted in bad faith and had violated the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing found in every contract.
The court reasoned as follows:
As to the second count, good faith and
fair dealing, there is no evidence before
the Court that there was any unfair dealing
or that there was any bad faith by the
defendant. The evidence does not establish
any requirement of the defendant. The
evidence does not establish any requirement
of the defendant to provide product, per se.
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
however, would prohibit the defendant from
failing to provide product in bad faith.
There is no evidence to suggest that there
was bad faith in doing so.
(R. 396-7)

The trial court found absolutely no evidence that

Dayna had acted other than in good faith and attributed the lack
of available product to "inaccurate projections."

-11-

(R. 397)

While every contract includes an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, that implied covenant will not
alter the terms of the contract.

Where explicit rights are

specified in a contract, any different or contrary implied
rights are precluded.

lf

[A]n express agreement or covenant

relating to a specific contract right, excludes the possibility
of an implied covenant of a different or contradictory nature. "
Ted R. Brown & Assoc. , Inc. v. Carnes Corp. , 753 P. 2d 964, 970
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citing Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd.. 618
P. 2d 497, 505 (Utah 1980)).

Thus, Searles could not rely on any

implied terms to limit or contradict Dayna' s rights as defined
in the contract.
The trial court' s reasons for granting Dayna' s motion
were stated in significant detail on the record.

(See R. 396-9)

The court subsequently entered its formal findings of fact and
conclusions of law in its "Statement of Grounds for Directed
Verdict."

(R. 191-3, attached hereto as Appendix B)

When a

trial court has made findings and entered judgment thereon, it
is the appellate court' s duty to review the evidence in the
light most favorable to the findings, which must be allowed to
stand if reasonable minds could agree with them.

Lawrence v.

Bamberger Railroad Co. . 3 Utah 2d 247, 282 P. 2d 335 (1955);
Child v. Havward. 16 Utah 2d 351, 400 P. 2d 758 (1965); Petty v.
Gindy Mfg. Corp. . 17 Utah 2d 32, 404 P. 2d 30 (1965); Petrie v.
General Contracting Co. , 17 Utah 2d 408, 413 P. 2d 600 (1966).
-12-

The findings of the trial court were well stated and supported
by the evidence at trial.
Searles argues that this Court should review the
evidence in a light most favorable to him.
p. 15)

(Searles' Brief

Searles argues that the standard of review set forth in

Davis v. Payne & Dav, Inc. , 10 Utah 2d 53, 348 P. 2d 337 (I960),
should be applied because the trial court failed to make finding
of fact as provided in Rule 52(a).

As discussed above, however,

the trial court did enter findings of fact both orally on the
record and again in a formal document.

The standard of review

used by the Davis court, however, is applicable only where no
findings have been entered by the trial court.
Involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b) is appropriate
either when the trial judge finds that the claimant has failed
to make out a prima facie case or when the trial judge is not
persuaded by the evidence presented by the claimant.

Lemon v.

Coates, 735 P. 2d 58 (Utah 1987); Southern Title Guarantee Co. v.
Bethers. 761 P. 2d 951 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

The trial judge

found that Searles had failed to make out a prima facie case.
Even if Searles had presented a technically correct prima facie
case, however, the trial judge clearly found the evidence
unpersuasive.
Involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b) is not limited
to cases where the plaintiff has failed to present a prima facie
case but is appropriate whenever the plaintiff fails to carry
-13-

his burden of persuasion.

The Utah Supreme Court has explained

the application of the Rule as follows:
When a court sitting without a jury has
heard all of plaintiff s evidence, it is
appropriate that the court shall then
determine whether or not the plaintiff has
convincingly shown a right to relief. It is
not reasonable to require a judge, on motion
to dismiss under Rule 41(b), to determine
merely whether there is a prima facie case,
such as in a jury trial should go to the
jury, when there is no jury--to determine
merely whether there is a prima facie case,
sufficient for the consideration of a trier
of the facts when he is himself the trier of
the facts. To apply the jury trial practice
to non-jury proceedings would be to erect a
requirement compelling a defendant to put on
his case and the court to spend the time and
incur the public expense of hearing it if
the plaintiff had, according to jury trial
concepts, made "a case for the jury," even
though the judge had concluded that on the
whole of the plaintiff s evidence the
plaintiff ought not to prevail. A plaintiff
who has had full opportunity to put on his
own case and has failed to convince the
judge, as trier of the facts, of a right to
relief, has no legal right under the due
process clause of the Constitution, to hear
the defendants' case, or to compel the court
to hear it, merely because the plaintiff s
case is a prima facie one in the jury trial
sense of the term.
Johnson v. Bell. 666 P. 2d 308, 311 (Utah 1983) (quoting Wineaar
v. Slim Olson. Inc. . 122 Utah 487, 252 P. 2d 205, 207 (1953))
(emphasis in original).
The record is clear that Dayna had grounds to
terminate Searles' employment under the express terms of the
contract.

(Tr. Ex. 2, attached hereto as Appendix A)
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The

employment contract between the parties governs their
relationship.

"The beginning point of interpretation of a

contract is an examination of the language used therein in
accordance with the ordinary and usual meaning of the words. "
Puah v. Stockdale & Co. , 570 P. 2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1977).
Paragraph 7D of the contract between Dayna and Searles
provides that Searles shall have the responsibility "[t]o
fulfill the Quota requirements established pursuant to this
Agreement. "

Paragraph 6 sets the quota for Searles for the

first quarter of the 1989 fiscal year at $1,000,000.

Searles

did not fulfill that quota obligation.
Paragraph 10 of the contract provides in pertinent
part;
This Agreement shall terminate prior to the
end of its Term . . . (iii) "for cause"
which shall include, but not be limited to .
. . any material breach of [Searles]
obligations, covenants, agreements or
warranties hereunder, or a failure by
[Searles] to perform the duties assigned to
[him] in an acceptable manner.
Searles testified that he did not meet his sales quota
for fiscal 1988 or for fiscal 1989.

(R. 336-7).

Dayna,

therefore, had grounds to terminate Searles "for cause" under
the explicit terms of the agreement between the parties.
Pursuant to Rule 41(b), the trial court sitting as
finder of the facts is entitled at the end of plaintiff s
presentation of evidence to weigh that evidence, and if it is
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found to be unbelievable or insufficient in some regard, to make
a ruling on the merits of the evidence and dismiss the
complaint.

Johnson v. Bell, 666 P. 2d 308, 311 (Utah 1983);

Southern Title Guar. Co.
1988).

v. Bethers, 761 P. 2d 951 (Utah Ct. App.

The trial court did, in fact, allow Searles to present

his case, weighed that evidence and found the evidence
insufficient to support a claim against Dayna.
In ruling on a motion for involuntary dismissal under
Rule 41(b), the "court does not make any special inferences in
the plaintiff's favor, instead, [the] court must examine and
weigh all of the evidence. "

Henderson. 731 F. Supp. at 1378

(citing Ekanem v. Health & Hosp. Corp. . 724 F. 2d 563, 568 (7th
Cir.

1983), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984).

In the present

case, however, the trial court considered the evidence in a
light most favorable to Searles and still found the evidence
insufficient.
C.

(R. 396)
The Dismissal of Searles7 Case Is Well-Supported
by Decisions Under the Parallel Federal Rule.

The involuntary dismissal of Searles' case against
Dayna is well-supported by similar cases decided in the Federal
courts under the parallel Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

In

Dance v. Ripley, 776 F. 2d 370 (1st Cir. 1985), the plaintiff, a
black woman brought an action under Title VII against the head
of the agency for which she worked claiming that she had been
discriminated against because of her race.

-16-

The plaintiff was

the only witness called for her case.
plaintiff rested.

After her testimony, the

The defendant then moved for dismissal under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b), arguing that plaintiff had failed to
establish a prima facie case, or, in the alternative, that
plaintiff s case had been rebutted by evidence that defendant' s
actions were legitimate and nondiscriminatory.
The district court granted the motion to dismiss,
issuing very brief findings of fact and conclusions of law under
Rule 52(a) that plaintiff had not presented a case that she was
rejected by reason of unlawful discrimination.
The plaintiff appealed, contending that the dismissal
was based on a finding that she had not presented a prima facie
case, and that she had presented a case.

The First Circuit

Court of Appeals affirmed finding that, although the district
court' s findings could have been clearer, it did not appear from
them that the district court simply rejected plaintiff's prima
facie case, but rather that the court had weighed plaintiff s
case against uncontested evidence of a nondiscriminatory motive,
and had found defendant' s rebuttal decisive.

The court

concluded that, once the plaintiff had rested her case, a Rule
41(b) dismissal was appropriate.
In the present case, the trial court reviewed the
evidence presented by Searles in support of his case and found
that evidence insufficient.

Although the trial court' s findings

could have been more detailed, the findings clearly support the
-17-

court' s ruling.

The findings are more than adequate to allow

this Court to review the basis for the trial court' s rulings.
The application of Rule 41(b) is well supported byother authority.

See, e. a. . Sepulveda v. Pacific Maritime

Ass' n. 878 F. 2d 1137, 1139 (9th Cir. ), cert, denied. 110 S. Ct.
561 (1989) (an action tried to the court may be dismissed
pursuant to Rule 41(b) when the district court considers the
evidence presented and finds that the plaintiff has failed to
establish a prima facie case); Feldman v. Pioneer Petroleum.
Inc. . 813 F. 2d 296 (10th Cir.), cert, denied. 484 U.S. 954
(1987) (involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b) was proper where
plaintiffs had not proven the necessary elements of their case);
Allres v. Amoco Production Co. , 774 F. 2d 409 (10th Cir. 1985)
(district court had not abused its discretion in granting motion
to dismiss under Rule 41(b)); Henderson v. United Parcel
Service. Inc. . 731 F. Supp. 1374 (S. D. Ind. 1990) (plaintiff
failed to set forth direct evidence of discrimination in a Title
VII action or establish a prima facie case that he was
discriminated against on the basis of race).
II.

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in
Denying Searles' Motion to Amend the Pleadings to
Conform to the Evidence.
At the conclusion of Searles' presentation of the

evidence but before formally resting, Searles made a motion to
amend the pleading to conform to the evidence.

Searles claimed

that the evidence had raised a question as to whether the
-18-

contract was a complete integration and suggested that there
were conditions precedent to Dayna' s ability to terminate
Searles for failure to reach his sales quota.

The court denied

the motion finding the contract to be "clear and unambiguous."
(R. 385).

A motion to amend the pleadings falls within the

sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned
absent an abuse of discretion.

Kelly v. Utah Power & Light. 746

P. 2d 1189 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Westlev v. Farmer' s Insurance
Exchange. 663 P. 2d 93 (Utah 1983).
A.

Searles Failed to Present Anv Admissible Evidence
that the Written Agreement Was Subject to
Conditions Precedent.

Amendment of the pleadings to conform to evidence
presented at trial is governed by Rule 15(b) which in pertinent
part provides as follows:
When issues not raised by the pleading are
tried by express or implied consent of the
parties, they shall be treated in all
respects as if they had been raised in the
pleadings. Such amendments of the pleadings
as may be necessary to cause them to conform
to the evidence and to raise these issues
may be made upon motion of any party at any
time . . . .
Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b) (emphasis supplied).

Amendment of the

pleadings to allege the existence of a condition precedent to
enforcement of the contract by Dayna was inappropriate because
Dayna did not expressly or impliedly consent to the trial of the
issue.
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In his own brief, Searles admits that "[t]hroughout
the trial and during presentation of Searle' s [sic] case, Dayna
objected to the Court considering any evidence that might be
used to contradict or vary the terms of the written agreement
between the parties."

(Searles7 Brief p. 18)

Time and time

again, Searles attempted to offer evidence that might vary the
express terms of the written contract between Searles and Dayna.
Counsel for Dayna consistently objected to the introduction of
any evidence that would contradict or vary the terms of the
agreement.

Counsel for Searles insisted that the evidence was

not offered to vary the terms of the agreement but only as
foundation and as evidence of whether or not Dayna acted in good
faith.

The trial court admitted the evidence only for this

limited purpose.

(See, e. g. , R. 35, 318-20, 338-9)

After

numerous objections from counsel for Dayna, and numerous
assurances from counsel for Searles that the evidence was not
being offered to vary the terms of the written agreement, the
following exchange took place:
THE COURT:
Let me tell you, I think
a more fair way to proceed here is since you
represent the plaintiff, the plaintiff has a
burden of proof, the plaintiff collects its
claims and throws out other alternative
claims, that if at any time you' re offering
a piece of evidence to vary the terms of the
agreement, then you need to tell us. How is
that? Then we don' t have to worry about
adding these objections. Is that a fair way
to proceed?

-20-

MR. PERKINS:

Yes.

I'll go with that.

MS. LEITH:
I think that would be
very helpful. Thank you, your Honor.
(R. 339)

Searles did not identify or offer any evidence to vary

the terms of the agreement.

At the conclusion of his

presentation of the evidence, Searles attempted to circumvent
Dayna' s objections and the court's rulings by moving to amend
the pleadings to conform to the evidence.

Because the evidence

was never offered to vary the terms of the agreement, the issue
was never tried and amendment under Rule 15(a) was
i nappropri ate.
Searles cites Stanaer v. Sentinel Sec. Life Ins. Co. ,
669 P. 2d 1201 (Utah 1983) for the proposition that where a
written contract is not the complete contract, parol evidence
may be admitted.

The Stanaer court explained the doctrine of

partial integration as follows:
The doctrine of partial integration is that
where a written contract is obviously not,
or is shown not to be, the complete
contract, parol evidence not inconsistent
with the writing is admissible to show what
the entire contract really was, by
supplementing, as distinguished from
contradicting, the writing. In such a case
parol evidence to prove the part not reduced
to writing is admissible, although it is not
admissible as to the part reduced to
writing.
Stanaer v. Sentinel Sec. Life Ins. Co. . 669 P. 2d 1201 (Utah
1983) (emphasis added).

Thus, parol evidence may only be

admitted under the partial integration doctrine if the evidence
-21-

is "not inconsistent with the writing."

The doctrine is clearly

inapplicable where, as in the present case, a party attempts to
introduce parol evidence to contradict or vary the terms of a
written agreement.
Searles had a full and fair opportunity to allege the
terms and conditions of his agreement with Dayna.

Searles

failed to present any evidence for the purpose of contradicting
or varying the terms of the written agreement.

Finding the

written agreement to be an integrated document, the trial court
refused to admit contradictory parol evidence or to allow the
pleadings to be amended to conform to this inadmissible
evidence.

The decision of the trial court to deny Searles7

motion to amend was not an abuse of the court' s discretion.
III.

Searles Has Failed to Present Anv Evidence That Shows
His Entitlement to Relief.
In his "Statement of Issues on Appeal" contained in

his brief, Searles appears to argue that the Court of Appeals
should make and enter its own findings and award judgment in his
favor.

(Searles Brief p. 7)

This argument is completely without

support in the body of the brief and is contrary to the
appropriate standards of review identified above.

Searles has,

however, attempted to introduce evidence of a ruling in another
case to establish the "law of the case" in the present action.
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A.

The Law of the Case Doctrine Is Inapplicable in
the Present Case.

Searles makes the astounding claim that an unpublished
decision in another case with different facts and different
parties, tried to a different judge, somehow establishes the
"law of the case" in the present case.

Searles acknowledges

that unpublished orders may not be cited as authority.
(Searles' Brief p.25)

Searles' argument appears to be nothing

more than an attempt to circumvent the Court' s prohibition on
the citation of unpublished authority.
The law of the case doctrine has no application where
two different cases are involved.

That doctrine was recently

explained by this Court:
The purpose of the law of the case
doctrine is "to avoid the delays and
difficulties that arise when one judge is
presented with an issue identical to one
which has already been passed upon by a
coordinate judge in the same case." Sittner
v. Big Horn Tar Sands & Oil. Inc. . 692 P. 2d
735, 736 (Utah 1984). Ordinarily, a judge
cannot overrule the decision of another
judge of the same court. Richardson v.
Grand Cent. Corp. . 572 P. 2d 395, 397 (Utah
1977). However, "the ruling of one judge as
to the sufficiency or effect of pleadings,
does not prevent another division of the
court from considering the same question of
law if it is properly involved on a
subsequent motion which presents the case in
a different light. " Id.
DeBrv v. Valley Mortgage Co. , 835 P. 2d 1000, 1003 (Utah Ct. App.
1992) (emphasis added).
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Thus, the law of the case doctrine has nothing to do
with the present case.

Searles' has presented a transcript of

an oral ruling by another judge, in another case, on different
facts, tried after the Searles case was decided.

The

unpublished transcript, therefore, has absolutely no
precedential value and should be disregarded by this Court.

CONCLUSION
Searles has failed to carry his burden of establishing
that the trial court erred in any of its rulings or that the
case should be remanded for further proceedings.

Accordingly,

Dayna respectfully urges this Court to AFFIRM the judgment of
the trial court.
DATED this

&f

day of November, 1992.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

Jor^E. Waddoups
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone:
(801) 532-3333
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I hereby certify that I caused four true and correct
copies of the within and foregoing Brief of Appellee to be
mailed, postage prepaid, this ^^7 ' day of November, 1992, to
the following:
D. Kendall Perkins
124 South 600 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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Patricia M. Leith, Bar No. 1932
Attorneys for Defendant
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM J. SEARLES,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.
DAYNA COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)

STATEMENT OF GROUNDS FOR
DIRECTED VERDICT

Civil No. 900902787CN
Honorable Michael R. Murphy

)

The Court, having granted the motion of defendant
Dayna Communications, Inc. for a directed verdict against the
plaintiff William J. Searles at the close of the plaintiff s
case, issues this brief written statement of the grounds for its
decision as required by Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION —

BREACH OF CONTRACT

The Court finds that Searles has failed to produce
evidence that Dayna violated the terms of the written contract
between the parties.
contract.
Searles7
contract.

"Cause" for termination is defined by the

"Cause" for termination was established here by
failure to meet sales quotas established by the
Therefore, Dayna' s termination of the contract for

g \wol\048\0QO012a8 W51-090991
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Searles' failure to meet his sales quotas was not a violation of
the contract.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION -- BREACH OF COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH
The Court finds that there is no evidence of unfair
dealing or bad faith on the part of the defendant Dayna
Communications, Inc.

The evidence does not establish an

obligation on the part of Dayna to provide new products.

There

is evidence to suggest that any failure on the part of Dayna to
meet its projections was natural to the industry.
Prognostications, perhaps particularly in the microcomputer
industry, are not always met.
Searles agreed in the written employment contract to
meet the sales quotas.
fault of his own.

He did not meet them, perhaps through no

A different situation would be presented if

the quotas were set after the contract was executed.
This case centers on basic notions of contract law.
Without construing the intent of the parties, it may be that the
provision for termination for failure to meet contract
responsibilities, which include meeting quotas, was included
because the industry tends to overestimate the market capacity
or the ability of research and development to place new products
on the market.

In any event, it was part of the agreement of

the parties.
Under the circumstances, Searles' remedy is not an
action for breach of contract or breach of good faith and fair
-2g: \wpl\048\000012a8. w51 -090991
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dealing.

His remedy is not to enter into a contract to produce

at a certain level unless he is satisfied that the products are
available and he is satisfied with other conditions he believes
are necessary for him to perform.
There is no evidence that this contract was immoral or
illegal or otherwise unenforceable.
An employment contract is not an unconditional
guarantee of continued employment; the employee is entitled to
continued employment under the contract only if he or she meets
the responsibilities agreed on in the contract.
DATED this

V ^ day of September-, 1991.
BY THE COURT:

h>~u^U / , /L~y
Honorable Michael R. Flurprny
Judge, Third J u d i c i a l D i / s t r i c t
Approved as to form:
D. Kendall Perkins
Attorney for Plaintiff
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Patricia M. Leith, Bar No. 1932
Attorneys for Defendant
<*>
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone:
(801) 532-3333
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM J. SEARLES,
JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. 900902787CN
DAYNA COMMUNICATIONS, INC.
a Utah corporation,

Honorable Michael R. Murphy

Defendant.

The Court, having granted defendant' s motion for a
directed verdict at the end of plaintiff s case,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the
defendant Dayna Communications, Inc. is awarded judgment against
the plaintiff for no cause of action.
, / *

£t^A_
-

MADE AND ENTERED this
Y
day of September, 1991.
BY THE COURT:
Z1
Honorable Michael R. 'Murphy
Judge, Third Judicial District
Approved as to form:
D. Kendall Perkins
Attorney for Plaintiff
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AREA DIRECTOR AGREEMENT
THIS AREA DIRECTOR AGREEMENT (the "Agreement") made and entered into
on the date set out below, by and between WILLIAM SEARLES ("AD") and DAYNA
COMMUNICATIONS, INC. ("Dayna"), each of whom acknowledges and agrees to
abide by these covenants.
RECITALS
1Dayna desires to secure the services of AD to promote sales of Dayna
Products, pursuant to the terms and conditions herein contained.
2AD desires to enter into this Agreement in order to receive compensation for
efforts to be expended by AD pursuant to the terms and conditions of this Agreement.
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and conditions
herein contained, and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and
sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto, intending to be legally
bound, do hereby agree as follows:
1-

Term.

The term of this Agreement shall begin on October 1,1988 and shall continue to
September 30, 1989, subject to prior termination as hereinafter provided. It is the
intention of the parties that this Agreement shall be reviewed, and a new and similar
Agreement shall be entered into to cover Dayna'sfiscalyear 1990, based on performance
under this Agreement.
2-

Salary.

The salary to be paid to AD by Dayna shall be Forty-four Thousand and no/100
Dollars ($44,000) computed on an annual basis, payable on a biweekly basis, pursuant to
Dayna's usual and customary payroll practices, and subject to termination as hereinafter
provided.
3-

Commission and Incentive Bonus.

The Override to be paid to AD for net dollars revenue to Daynafromthe
assigned Territory (see Paragraph 5, Territory) in the first six months of the Term of the
Agreement shall be one percent (1%) of all net dollars to Dayna as a result of sales to all
Buyers other than Disributors. Revenue dollars from sales to Distributors in thefirstsix
months of the Term of the Agreement shall earn Override of six-tenths of one percent
(0.6%). The Override to be paid to AD in the second six months of the Term of the
Agreement for all Buyers other than Distributors shall be eight-tenths of one percent
(0.8%). Revenue dollarsfromsales to Distributors shall continue to earn Override of sixtenths of one percent (0.6%). Commission and Override on all Major National Store
Chains shall be paid at the rate of seventy-five percent (75%) to the Area into which the
goods are shipped, twenty-five percent (25%) to the Area handling the Corporate offices.
A-

Neither Commission nor Override shall be paid on service revenues,
spare parts or accessories ordered from Customer Support, or on
component pans of any Dayna product that may be ordered as a

result of negotiations conducted by persons employed by Dayna
other than the AD or Agents under his control.

4-

B-

The Commission and Override shall be paid on net dollars received
by Dayna. In the event substantial or extraordinary discounts are
offered in order to obtain a specific contract, the Commission or
Override rate, if any, may be negotiated by Dayna's Vice President
of Sales, or other authorized Dayna officer.

D-

Incentive Commission shall be paid for performance in excess of
Quota (see Paragraph 6, Quota).In the first six months of the Term
of the Agreement, Quota shall have been met when the Quota for
First Six Months has been shipped and invoiced by the
Company.Incentive Commissions shall be paid on all dollars in
excess of Quota that have been shipped and invoiced during that six
month period. In the second six months of the Term of the
Agreement, Quota shall have been met when the Annual Quota has
been shipped and invoiced by the Company, and Incentive
Commission shall be paid on all dollars in excess of that Quota that
have been shipped and invoiced during the Fiscal Year. Incentive
Commission shall consist of two times the Commission Rate.

F-

In order to earn the Override the AD or agents under his control
must obtain a purchase order against which product may be properly
shipped and invoiced, and the customer must honor the invoice with
payment. UNTIL THE PAYMENT IS COMPLETE, THE
COMMISSION HAS NOT BEEN EARNED.
Notwithstanding this fact, Dayna may elect to pay the Commission
in anticipation of payment being completed. In that event, should
payment not be completed, the AD may be charged back an amount
equal to the Commission paid.

G-

The Commission shall be paid on the last paycheck of each month,
for the previous monthly period, (i.e., April's Commission paid on
last paycheck of May).

Expenses.

Dayna shall reimburse AD for the reasonable amount of hotel, traveling,
entertainment and other expenses wholly, exclusively, and necessarily incurred by AD in
the discharge of AD's duties hereunder, in accordance with the normal practice for such
reimbursements by Dayna to its other employees. AD shall submit to Dayna
substantiation of the expenses incurred, as reflected in a credit card statement or other
documentation, together with a record of (1) the amount of the expenditure, (2) the time,
place and nature of the expenditure, (3) the business reason for the expenditure and
expected benefit, (4) the names, positions and other information concerning individuals
entertained sufficient to establish their business relationship to Dayna, and (5) any and all
other information specifically required by Dayna, from time to time. The foregoing
information shall submitted in such form as Dayna may, from time to time, determine.
Reimbursement of expenses shall be contingent upon the approval of Dayna's Vice
President of Sales, or other authorized Davna officer.

5-

Territory.

The AD shall have as his Area of Management the States West of the
Mississippi River, and the States of Alaska and Hawaii, except for the States of
Minnesota, Iowa, and Missouri.
The foregoing Territory assignment shall be subject to change at Dayna's
sole discretion.
6-

Quota.
The Quota assigned to AD shall be as set forth below for the Term
of this Agreement:
Quarter 1, Fiscal 1989
$ 1,000,000
Quarter 2, Fiscal 1989
$1,400.000
First Six Months Quota
$2,400,000

Quarter 3, Fiscal 1989
$2,600,000
Quarter 4, Fiscal 1989
$3.800.000
Annual Quota Fiscal 1989
The Quota is to be derived from the assigned Area.
7-

$8,800,000

Responsibilities of Area Director.
The AD shall have the following responsibilities:

ATo obtain, or direct agents under his control to obtain, orders for
Dayna Products which can be shipped and invoiced with complete expectation that the
customer will honor the invoice with payment at prices specified in Dayna's published
pricing schedules, or pursuant to specific contracts with such customer.
BTo represent Dayna, its products, personnel and business in a
manner which Dayna shall prescribe as appropriate for its sales personnel.
CTo refrain from making any misleading, inaccurate or other
improper statement, orfromgiving such indication to any third party relative to Dayna's
business, products or relationships.
D-

To fulfill the Quota requirements established pursuant to this

Agreement.
8-

Time Devoted by Area Director.

AD agrees to devote his or her full business time, attention, efforts and
abilities exclusively to the business of Dayna and to use his or her utmost endeavors to
promote the interests of Dayna.
9-

Chargebacks.

In the event of payment of the Commission in advance of receipt by Dayna
of all monies from the customers on orders covered by such payment, or in the event a

draw against Commission is outstanding, a "chargeback" in the amount of the
Commission shall be paid to Dayna by AD should the employment of AD be terminated.
10-

Termination.

This Agreement shall terminate automatically at the end of its Term. This
Agreement shall terminate prior to the end of its Term (i) at the death of AD, or (ii) at
Dayna's option and upon the giving of ninety (90) days' written notice of termination to
AD, or (iii) "for cause" which shall include, but not be limited to, conviction of a felony,
dishonesty, breach of confidentiality, any material breach of AD's obligations,
covenants, agreements or warranties hereunder, or a failure by AD to perform the duties
assigned to AD in an acceptable manner. If employment is terminated pursuant to this
paragraph, all compensation shall cease and no additional amounts will be payable to AD
by Dayna, or to AD's heirs, executors, administrators or legal representatives, other than
that portion of any Commission which was earned by AD, pursuant to the terms hereof,
prior to such termination, net of any chargeback.
11-

Entire Agreement.

This Agreement contains the entire agreement between the parties pertaining to the
subject matter hereof. This Agreement shall be subject to, and construed in accordance
with, the laws of the State of Utah. This Agreement shall supercede any and all prior
agreements between the parties.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have set their hands this
, 1988.

. day of

AREA DIRECTOR

COMMUNICATIONS, INC.

,#/-v
Barnes F. Waltz
VICE PRESIDENT, SALES

W. SEARLES
EXHIBIT "B"
THIS EXHIBIT DESCRIBES CERTAIN ACCOUNTS assigned the
District Sales Manager or the Area Sales Manager. These accounts are the
Territory of the designated Field Sales Representative. The support of
these accounts does remain the duty of the Dealer Support Sales Rep
responsible for the geographical territory.
CERTAIN SPECIFIC ACCOUNTS ARE EXCEPTED from the
Territories of all Field Sales Representatives. These accounts are:
Apple Computer
Cupertino, CA and all
ordering offices,
world-wide.
PRC (FAA contract only)
Washington, DC area
Apple Third Party Developers
Domestic U.S.
TERRITORIAL ACCOUNTS
EDS Technical Products
Resource Dynamics
Alphagraphics
Big Three Industries
Diamond Shamrock Corporation
E-Systems, Inc.
Fleming Companies
Lomas and Nettleton Financial Corp
NASA Space Center
TXSchlumberger, Ltd.
Shell Oil Company
Alpha-Beta
University of Utah

{t&^t&wf

7P/'L'^/^-

/%wf

Richardson, TX
Dallas, TX
Tucson, AZ
Houston, TX
Dallas, TX
Dallas, TX
Oklahoma City, OK
Dallas, TX
Houston,
Dallas, TX
Houston, TXScaggs
Salt Lake City, UT
Salt Lake City, UT
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM J. SEARLES,

]
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]

vs.

]

Case No. 900902787CN
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I misspoke when I said I did not

MS. LEITH:

1

I do have the same

2

have an objection tc Exhibit 3.

3

objection.

4

purposes of varying the terms of Exhib it 2

That is that it shou Id not be <admitted for

5

THE COURT:

6

purposes of varying Exhibit 2?
MR. PERKINS:

7
8

Do you intend to use that. for

Same purpose as we have stated

with regard to Exhibit 1, your Honor.
THE COURT:

9

Which includes the proposition

10

neither 1 nor 3 are intended for the purpose of varying

11

the terms of Exhibit 2?

12

MR. PERKINS:

13

THE COURT:

That's correct.

All right.

1 and 3 are then

14

received for the limited purposes indicated, and the

15

objection to any further use is sustained.

16

Q.

(By Mr. Perkins)

Now, with regard to the other

17

products, Mr. Romney, we talked about Dayna Net and its

18

projections, Dayna Talk had a couple of varieties; is

19

that correct, there was a PC version and Mac version?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

And tests projected that these products, too,

22

would come on line and be able to be sold and develop

23

additional revenues for the company?

24

A.

Correct.

25

Q.

They too were delayed, weren't they?
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which we were operating sales of the company proposed for
fiscal 1989.
Q.

And that included how the company was going to

achieve the quota goals that had been or were being set?
A.

Yes. A number of the pages here refer to the

sales quotas by area, by sales person, and so on.
Q.

And do you recall if Mr. Searles participated

in the preparation of this plan?
A.

I don't know what involvement Bill had in the

preparation of the plan.

It was prepared and modified on

various occasions by Jim Walls.

I believe he would claim

to be the author of the document from beginning to end.
Q.

Do you recall if this plan was adopted by the

company to set forth the sales plan it would pursue?
A.

Well, in effect, it was adopted.

I'm not sure

we ever had any kind of a formal adoption by the company
of the sales pl^n, okay?

We agreed that we were going to

try to make this plan happen and took steps in that
direction.
Q.

So it wouldn't require the board to adopt it,

but management would decide this looks like a reasonable
thing to do, so let's do it?
A.

Correct.
MR. PERKINS:
MS. LEITH:

I move for the admission of 7-P.

I would object to the admission for
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any purpose other than to go to the issue of good faith.
THE COURT:

Do you have any other purposes for

offering it?
MR, PERKINS: Well, we have been talking very
narrowly about the issue of good faith, your Honor. I
think there's also —

there are also issues that have

related to good faith but that are involving implied
conditions to the employment contract.

I believe that it

can be shown that the company, by implication, said that
"We're going to provide additional personnel, promotional
money, money to hire new people, and we're going to have
product ready to be sold and delivered to enable the
sales force to be able to meet the quota goals."
THE COURT:

But does that relate to anything

that's an attempt to vary the express terms of the
contract?
MR. PERKINS:

I don't think it varies the term.

It, again, goes to good faith by implying these things
would be done to enable the sales force to meet quota
and, if not done, it goes to whether or not the
termination clause of the employment agreement was
exercised in good faith or not.
THE COURT:

All right.

I'll take that to mean

it's not being offered to vary the term of the contract,
and with that limitation in mind —

what is it, 7?
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MR. PERKINS: Yes.

Q.

THE COURT:

7 is received.

MS. LEITH:

Thank you, your Honor.

(By Mr. Perkins)

I'll direct your attention to

the third page of that document, which is an
organizational chart dated 9-30-88 in the left-hand upper
corner, and on the right side under Jim Walls, it shows
Western Area Sales Director, W. Searles, and it has four
locations, Los Angeles, San Jose, Dallas and Seattle.
Everywhere but the San Jose entry it shows sales open
fiscal year '89.
Now, does that entry mean that it's proposed to
add a sales employee under Mr. Searles in that location?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And so at that time there was only P. Sun.

That was someone who was an existing employee?
A.

Yes, Pam Sun.

Q.

Now, were these other three locations — or did

these other three locations ever receive a sales
representative as projected?
A.

Los Angeles did.

I don't believe we ever hired

anybody in Dallas or Seattle.

May I note that Seattle

doesn't call for a sales person.

It calls for a support

person.
Q.

What's the difference between sales and
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A.

Yes.

Q.

The quota is a percentage mark that if the

sales director meets that quota, he then gets commission
of twice the usual rate?
A.

I think the effect of it —

and, by the way, it

was never achieved by Mr. Searles, nor anyone else that I
can remember —

the effect was to set a quota for

performance and if there were stellar performances beyond
that quota, for those sales that were beyond the quota
amounts, the commission rate would double.

But it

wouldn't affect any commission rate for sales up to
quota.
Q.

That's true.

But nobody made quota, did they?

A.

I don't recall and I haven't analyzed that.

There might have been someone who made quota.

Quotas

were different for various types of sales people.
Q.

That's true.

But no area director made their

quota, did they?
A.

Of the two, no.

I don't believe either

Mr. Zachery or Mr. Searles made quota.
Q.

Did Mr. Walls have a quota requirement in his

employment agreement?
A.

He had no employment agreement.

Q.

He was working month to month.

you would call it month to month.

I don't know if

It's working day to
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Q.

And what were your goals in obtaining a written

agreement?
A.

To not have any misunderstandings with respect

to the employment conditions.
Q.

To have a set term of employment?

A.

This agreement was from August 12 until the end

of September, which was fiscal year '88 for Dayna.
Q.

I see.

A.

At that time I signed another agreement which

was for one year beginning, basically, October 1st of
'88.
Q.

But when you first came on as an employee of

Dayna Communications, you didn't anticipate merely
working for a six-week period, did you?
A.

Absolutely not.

Q.

Was there a discussion with Mr. Walls that he

would have an employment agreement for a term longer than
the expiration of their current fiscal year?
A.

Under this agreement or —

Q.

No.

A.

—

Q.

This agreement only lasted the six weeks?

A.

Six weeks; that's correct.

Q.

Was there a discussion with Mr. Walls that

the next agreement?

after this agreement ended there would be another written
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agreement with a different term?
A,

Absolutely.

Q.

Okay.

If I can show you Exhibit 2 —

let's go back to Exhibit 1.
is entitled Quota.

well,

The second page, paragraph 6

On the third page it states that a

quota signed to the A.D., which, I assume, is the area
director, for the remainder of fiscal 1988 until
September 30 of 1988 or $550,000 in sales.

Was that

achieved?
A.

To the best of my knowledge, it was not.

Q.

Was there any comment or complaint about your

not having achieved that quota?
A.

No.

Q.

Do you know what quota based on that was

included in Exhibit 1-P?
A.

Quotas had to be assigned.

Jim had a sales

quota, per se, and that total sales quota had to be
assigned to the various area directors, the international
sales people, the telemarketing sales director,
Bob Barrett.
Q.

This was any portion of that total quota.

Did anybody meet their quota for the end of

fiscal f88?
A.

To the best of my knowledge, no.

The possible

exception may have been John at international.
Q.

Domestically?
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A-

No.

Q.

Directing your attention to what has been

marked Exhibit 2-P, is this the next agreement you signed
for fiscal year '89?
A.

Yes, it was.

Q.

Directing your attention to the third page

again, paragraph 6, the quota provision, there are four
quota requirements, the first six months1 quota totals
two million four.

First quarter, a million, second

quarter is a million four.

Were those numbers achieved?

A.

No, they were not.

Q.

Were there any reasons why those quotas weren't

achieved?
A.

We all felt that the first quarter fiscal quota

was going to be a Hail Mary, so to speak, pass until we
started being able to ship new product, primarily Dayna
Mail, Dayna Talk and Dayna Net.
Q.

Okay.

A.

So we had to rely on the old product, which was

Dayna File, for the first quarter.
Q.

Was that the only product you had to sell in

the first quarter of '89?
A.

That was the only product we had to sell that

could be delivered.

It was not the only product that we

had to sell.
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Q.

Okay.

Now, approximately how many units would

have to have been moved to reach the million dollar mark
in the first quarter?
A.

It would be an average of 2,000 units divided

by an average of $550 per unit. My calculations — I
don't have a calculator in front of me.
Q.

That was for just your part of the production;

is that correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Was there an understanding as to what

percentage of the total company production you were going
to be responsible for?
MS. LEITH:

Your Honor, I'll object to the

extent that it's parol evidence, outside the term of the
contract.
MR. PERKINS:

I think it's foundational and

will ultimately go toward indicating whether or not good
faith or good faith exercise of contracts or terms was
affected by the defendant.
THE COURT:

And therefore not varying the term

of the agreement?
MR. PERKINS: Right.
MS. LEITH:

His question was what was the

understanding of that percentage.

If that does not go

toward varying to or adding to the term of the contract,
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then I have no objection if the evidence is admitted.
THE COURT:

Let me tell you, I think a more

fair way to proceed here is since you represent the
plaintiff, the plaintiff has a burden of proof, the
plaintiff collects its claims and throws out other
alternative claims, that if at any time you're offering a
piece of evidence to vary the terms of the agreement,
then you need to tell us.

How is that?

Then we don't

have to worry about adding these objections.

Is that a

fair way to proceed?
MR. PERKINS:
MS. LEITH:

Yes.

I'll go with that.

I think that would be very helpful.

Thank you, your Honor.
Q.

(By Mr. Perkins)

So do you recall if there was

discussions as to how much of the company's total
production you were going to be responsible for?
A.

Well, we had a total annual quota of $8.8

million, as I recall.

The sales objective for the

company fiscal '89 was around $25 million.

Just a little

less than one-third of it.
Q.

Okay.

Now, that would be consistent with three

basic areas, or were there more than three basic areas:
western United States, eastern and international?
A.

That's correct.

There was a fourth area, which

was the telemarketing, but to clarify one thing that Brad
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1

termination, and I thought that was going to did they

2

make an inquiry of the employer.

3

MR. PERKINS:

Excuse me.

The question was:

Did the

4

unemployment intake worker inquire as to why h e i«?as

5

terminated?

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. PERKINS:

8

THE COURT:

9

THE WITNESS:

20

THE COURT:

11

14

Yes.
What was your answer?
I was laid off.
All right.

The answer will stand.

The objection is overruled.
MS. LEITH:

12
13

Inquire of him?

Q.

Thank you.

(By Mr. Perkins)

Did your former employer ever

contest that information?

15

A.

Not to my knowledge, no.

16

Q.

You didn't have a hearing before the

17

unemployment department as to whether or not you had been

18

terminated for cause and therefore not entitled to the

19

same amount of unemployment benefits as if you had been

20

laid off?

21

A.

No, that f s correct.

22

Q.

Showing you what's been marked Exhibit 6, have

23
24
25

you seen that document before?
A.

I have seen the document up through the January

daily report.
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1

becoming effective,"

2

And I think that the evidence clearly shows the

3

corporation, Dayna Communications, had an obligation to

4

provide additional funding, to provide additional head

5

count to sell the product, and to in fact supply product

5

to be sold on a timely basis to enable the sales crew to

7

meet the quotas as set forth in the agreements.

8

If they didn't do that, then they breached

9 I

their obligation which was

10

be extremely unfair and unjust to hold the sales force to

11

meeting quotas that were predicated on those

12

considerations.

23

THE COURT:

implied, and I think it would

All right.

Motion is denied for

14

the following reasons:

25

and unambiguous.

26

and those are the preliminary determinations of the

17

Court, the evidence that's been offered, which is the

i8

premise of the motion to amend to conform with the

29

evidence is such that these items that are called

20

conditions do not rise to the level of the conditions.

2i

The contract in question is clear

If it contains an integration clause

They were admitted specifically for the purpose

22

of

23

contract, and even if admitted for the purpose of

24

amending the contract, they do not rise to the level of

25

conditions precedent.

—

well, for any purpose over and above amending the
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1

Honor.

2

I'd like to point out that the contract at

3 I

issue, Exhibit 2, does not have any kind of notice

4

requirement or any kind of procedure for termination.

5

J

6

It

just states grounds, and those grounds are called "for
cause."

7

And I would also like to point out that for

8 J

cause does not necessarily impose a guilt requirement or

9

fault, as Mr. Perkins has suggested.

10

been introduced that Mr. Walls gave to Mr. Searles about

11

his termination doesn't say anything about fault or guilt

12

or cause.

13

was acting in bad faith, Dayna was acting in good faith.

14

Dayna cooperated with these people, Dayna did what it

15

could to make the sales good, Dayna had an interest in

16

seeing that Mr. Searles did well, because that was in

17

Dayna f s interest too.

18

the time of the termination, giving Mr. Searles more

19

money than he was actually entitled to under the

20

contract.

2i

might be about good faith execution of the contract.

22

The notice that has

I think, contrary to the assertion that Dayna

And Dayna was trying to be nice at

And I think that negates any doubt that there

THE COURT:

In consideration of the motion, the

23

Court construes the evidence in a light most favorable to

24

the plaintiff, Mr. Searles.

25

I should indicate that in one of my previous rulings on

And as an additional point,
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1

either a motion for a protective order by the defendant

2

or motion to compel by the plaintiff, I ordered that

3

information concerning other employees be produced so

4

that Mr. Searles would have the opportunity to put on

5

evidence that his termination was pretextual.

6

evidence came before me today.

7

No such

With those prefatory matters in mind, I'm going

S

to grant the motion for the following reasons:

9

Count 1, the literal contract claim.

10

been a failure to produce any evidence that the defendant

11

violated any terms and conditions of the contract in

12

terminating the defendant.

13

evidence, construed in a light most favorable for the

14

plaintiff, was terminated for cause.

15

the contract, not by any moral considerations or anything

16

like that.

17

established, in part, by failure to meet quotas.

18

There's

Defendant, according to the

Cause is defined by

Cause in this particular contract is

The evidence unequivocally indicates that the

19

defendant concedes that the quotas were not met.

20

Therefore, the contract provision on cause could be

2i

invoked, it was invoked, and the termination was had, and

22

the termination does not constitute a violation of the

23

contract.

24
25

As to the second count, good faith and fair
dealing, there is no evidence before the Court that there
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1

was any unfair dealing or that there was any bad faith by

2

the defendant.

3

requirement of the defendant to provide product, per se.

4

The covenant of good faith and fair dealing, however,

5

would prohibit the defendant from failing to provide

6

product in bad faith.

7

that there was bad faith in doing so.

8

The evidence does not establish any

There is no evidence to suggest

There is, however, evidence that would

9

suggest —

and not to credit it or discredit it, all I'm

10

saying is there's been a failure of evidence.

11

is evidence to suggest that the failure of providing

12

product was somewhat natural to this industry in the

13

sense that that occurs from time to time and that hope

14

springs eternal, evidently, in this industry, and

25

frequently prognostications are not met.

But there

16

The conduct generating the failure to provide

17

product and necessarily the inability of the plaintiff,

18

through no fault of his, to meet the quotas was due to

19

inaccurate projections.

20

Now, it would be one thing if these quotas were

2i

set after the signing of the contract or that something

22

occurred thereafter by the defendant and affirmatively

23

and in bad faith or unfair interfering with defendant to

24

meet his quotas.

25

case.

There is no evidence of that in this
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1

What this case is really about is what are

2

contracts about?

Without construing the motivation

3

behind the for cause provision premised on quotas in the

4

contract, it could well have been that that provision is

5

in there because the industry tends to overestimate the

6

market capacity or the ability of research and

7

development to place the product on the market at or

8

before the time anticipated.

9

The real difficulty in this case is not a

iO

breach of contract or breach of good faith and fair

U

dealing.

12

will allow the defendant to terminate for failure to meet

13

quotas when the product is not available.

14

is not in this contract and, thus, that remedy is

25

unavailable.

16

evidence that it's a contract of adhesion, that it's

17

immoral, unlawful or anything else.

18

contract is not a guarantee of employment.

j9

guarantee of employment only if all conditions from the

20

employee's side are met, where they were not met in this

2i

case, through no fault of the plaintiff, but that's not a

22

basis upon which to find a breach of contract or breach

23

of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

24
25

The remedy is to not enter into contracts that

Such provision

The contract itself, there's been no

And, therefore, the
It's a

For the reason stated, the motion under Rule
50, is granted and there is still pending before me a
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1

motion to dismiss, which is, therefore, mooted by my

l

ruling now.

3

requires findings of fact and conclusions of law,

4

because, in effect, my obligation as a finder of fact is

5

never invoked until the prima facie case is established.

6

I have determined that no prima facie case has

A motion under Rule 50 is not one which

7

been established and, thus, not a finding for findings of

8

fact and conclusions of law.

9

obligation that the ruling of the Court, when there were

10

multiple grounds for it, must be set forth in writing.

11

believe that's stated in Rule 52.

12

need to prepare an order or judgment consistent with the

23

Court's ruling here.

14

referring to —

25

requirement to have more than just a judgment for the

16

defendant, then you'll find it in Rule 52, and you should

17

adhere to that if there's such an obligation, and submit

18

to me the judgment in accordance with Rule 504.

There is, however, an

So, Ms. Leith, you

And I believe under the rule I was

that's not right.

29

MS. LEITH:

20

provision that you referred to?

2i

I

If there's a

Your Honor, are you looking for the

THE COURT: Mo.

I'm trying to make up my mind

22

on taxable costs.

Well, I'm not going to say anything

23

about costs here.

I'll tell you why.

24

then it's still open, even though the presumption is that

25

the taxable costs are awarded to the prevailing party.

If I say nothing
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